Website of Daniel A. Mayer

Verifiable Private Equality Test

Enabling Unbiased 2-Party Reconciliation on Ordered Sets in the Malicious Model

Authors

Daniel A. Mayer and Susanne Wetzel

Conference

Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security (ASIACCS)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce the novel notion called Verifiable Private Equality Test (VPET) and propose an efficient 2-party protocol for its implementation. VPET enables two parties to securely perform an arbitrary number of comparisons on a fixed collection of (key, value) pairs and thus it is more generic than existing techniques such as Private Equality Test and Private Set Intersection. In addition, we demonstrate how higher-level protocols such as Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation on Ordered Sets (PROS) can be implemented using VPET. Using simulation-based techniques, our new protocols are proven secure in the malicious model. Furthermore, we present a theoretical complexity analysis as well as a thorough experimental performance evaluation of the C++ implementation of our new VPET and PROS protocols.

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BibTeX

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@inproceedings{asiaccs2012,
 author = {Mayer, Daniel A. and Wetzel, Susanne},
 title = {Verifiable Private Equality Test: Enabling Unbiased 2-Party Reconciliation on Ordered Sets in the Malicious Model},
 booktitle = {Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security},
 abstract = {<p>In this paper we introduce the novel notion called Verifiable Private Equality Test (VPET) and propose an efficient 2-party protocol for its implementation. VPET enables two parties to securely perform an arbitrary number of comparisons on a fixed collection of (key, value) pairs and thus it is more generic than existing techniques such as Private Equality Test and Private Set Intersection. In addition, we demonstrate how higher-level protocols such as Privacy-Preserving Reconciliation on Ordered Sets (PROS) can be implemented using VPET. Using simulation-based techniques, our new protocols are proven secure in the malicious model. Furthermore, we present a theoretical complexity analysis as well as a thorough experimental performance evaluation of the C++ implementation of our new VPET and PROS protocols.</p>},
 series = {ASIACCS '12},
 year = {2012},
 isbn = {978-1-4503-1648-4},
 location = {Seoul, Korea},
 pages = {46--47},
 numpages = {2},
 url = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2414456.2414482},
 doi = {10.1145/2414456.2414482},
 acmid = {2414482},
 publisher = {ACM},
 address = {New York, NY, USA},
}